Abstract
Introduction
Mathematics and arithmetic form a prototypical cognitive system, defined by (largely) specifiable rules which are almost universally understood in modern society. System or domain knowledge and the skills to use That knowledge are acquired relatively early in life (although learning and improvement clearly can continuc throughout a lifetime), and are used in grossly similar ways by all adults. Both cognitive psychologists --* Colresponding author. Fax: (49) 7071-295956. E-mail: pauli@com-servl.ldv.uni-tuebingen.dbp.de and psychophysiologists have employed mental arithmetic problems as a paradigm to study higher order mental processes.
Some important facts are beginning to emerge from behavioral studies of arithmetic and mathematical processes (see special issue of Cognition, 1992) . Much of this empirical work has used a mental arithmetic task, in which subjects are given single-digit problems such as 8+3=?
or 6x4=? and are scored primarily according to speed of answer production.
These are relatively simple problems for adult subjects, yet practice reveals significant performance speed-up, following the power law [19, 25] . Another result, reliably observed across a number of experiments, is the prob-P. Pauli et (11. / ('ognitiw Bruin Rescwclt 2 (lYY4) Icm-size effect [6, 36, 38] . Roughly speaking, the larger the product of any multiplication operation, the more time it takes to produce a correct answer. The problem size effect decreases with practice, but has not been eliminated even in experiments which have provided up to 12 sessions of sustained practice on a subset of single-digit mental multiplication problems [ 131. Theoretical interpretations of mental arithmetic emphasize one or both of two fundamental processes, fact retrieval and rapid calculation.
On the one hand highly skilled mental multiplication appears primarily to depend on retrieval from an associative network of arithmetic facts. This conclusion is documented by interference and priming effects in both normal and braindamaged subjects, which indicate that answer production is primarily a matter of retrieving numeric facts from memory and that fact retrieval reflects associative network processes in which multiple problem and answer representations are activated during every retrieval attempt [8, 28, 29, 37] . On the other hand, some studies, especially those using strategy probing techniques [2, 5, 36] suggest that access to stored answers is not the only problem solving mechanism available. Under some circumstances, subjects calculate or derive a correct answer by mediating strategies, such as repeated addition (7 x 3 = 7 + 7 + 7), anchor and adjust (8 x 6 = 8 x 5 + 6) or the like.
The theoretical framework of McCloskey, Caramazza and Basili [22] incorporates both a retrieval and a calculational route to answer production. In this system, arithmetic problems are interpreted within an encoding subsystem that translates the perceptual characteristics of a problem, as presented, into an abstract format suitable for processing within a second subsystem that incorporates both calculational strategies and direct access to numerical facts. Direct access is generally a faster route to arithmetic facts but weak associative connections and interference processes can create circumstances in which answers are produced through one or another calculational procedure. In either cast, the answer, once attained in abstract form, must be decoded to produce a response program capable of execution within the parameters of the task. As an empirical understanding of mental arithmetic emerges, it is natural to ask whether there is neurophysiological evidence for putative cognitive componcnts of the task and about possible systematic relationships between these brain activities and variables, like problem size and practice, that are known to affect speed and accuracy of performance.
For example, recent results [S,27] imply that part of the speed-up in response times with practice is attributable to a transition from algorithmic answer calculation on early trials to direct access to answers in a fact network for all problems on later trials. The basis of performance changes with practice from deliberate, conscious effort to generate an answer to automatic, effortless answer retrieval. Results reviewed by Moscovitch and Winocur [24] suggest that consciously controlled processes are more dependent on frontal lobe function than are automatic processes. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to expect that practice in mental arithmetic will lead to a detectable transition in primary locus of brain activity.
The EEG offers a way to monitor brain activity in real time and thereby to track any transitions that parallel changes in behavior. Moreover, event-related potentials (ERPs) are signs of specific stages of information processing 14,101. There is some evidence of an association between slow brain potentials and the task demands of mental arithmetic. One finding is that more difficult tasks are associated with more positive amplitude levels [9, 33] . Further, mental arithmetic tasks seem to be associated with a relative positivity over the frontal cortex [3,32,33,34,3.5] The present study uses a somewhat different approach to seek a further refinement of the relationship between performance in mental arithmetic and characteristics of the ERPs. So far, all studies varied task difficulty by using different kinds of mental operations, for example, comparing performance on addition versus multiplication problems [9, 32, 34, 35] . We used only one kind of operation (single digit multiplication) and evaluated the effect of two independent variables, problem-size and practice, on ERPs. Two main hypothesis were tested: (1) The problem-size of the task is directly related to the amount of positivity in the ERP. (2) Because practice makes direct retrieval more and calculation strategies less likely, it should lead to a focusing of brain activity. In particular, WC expect a reduction of frontal brain activity with practice. In contrast, temporo-centro-parietal regions are functionally necessary for automated mental arithmetic, implying that activity in this region will remain relatively stable with practice.
Materials and methods

I. Subjects
Fifteen right-handed subjects (I 2 
Results
BehalYoral data
For all three reaction times (RTO, RTl, RT2) ANOVAs revealed highly significant PRACTICE and DIFFICULTY main effects and PRACTICE by DIF-FICULTY interactions (Table 1 ). The more difficult P. Pauli et al. / Cogmtilx Brain Research 2 (1994) 21-29 Table 1 ANOVAs with repeated measures on four practice sessions (P) and three problem difficulty levels (D) for the three behavioral measures, RTO (beginning of the cursor movement), RTl (indication of the first answer digit), and RT2 (indication of the second answer digit)
Practice 3,39 27.7 0.56 < 0.00 31.7 0.68 < 0.00 26.7 0.61 < 0.00 Difficulty 2,26 46.3 0.58 < 0.00 41.6 0.64 < 0.00 39.7 0.61 < 0.00 PxD 6,78 12.0 0.41 < 0.00 11.6 0.44 < 0.00 9.3 0.48 < 0.00 G-G refers to Greenhouse-Gneisser epsilon.
the task, the greater the RT reduction with practice. This observation is verified by post-hoc means comparisons, which reveal that RTO for difficulty tasks significantly decreased from session to session (Sl vs S2, P < 0.0001; s2 vs. s3, P = 0.009; s3 vs. s4, P = 0.02), whereas this is not true for easy tasks (Sl vs. S2, P = 0.005; S2 vs. S3, n.s.; S3 vs. S4, n.s.). However, difficult tasks still yield longer RTOs than easy tasks even after four practice sessions (S4-easy vs Sbdifficult, P < 0.0001). Similar effects were found for RTl and RT2, but in order to avoid redundancy will not be explicitly presented.
Consistent with the power law of practice, log RTO decreases linearly with log session (Fig. 1). 
EEG
Stimulus synchronized
ERPs (grand averages over all electrodes) differentiated for task difficulties and practice sessions are presented in Fig. 2 . Task difficulty seems to be reflected mainly in the offset latency of slow wave, while practice affects both the amplitude of positivity and the offset latency of slow wave. Negativity peaked clearly after response initiation (RTO) under all conditions, however, the pre-response amplitude 0 easy c1 moderate CI dlffwlt Log Session Fig. 1 . Log reaction times plotted as a function of log practice session and problem difficulty CRT0 = beginning of the cursor movement). seems to be more negative as a function of task difficulty.
Amplitude of positicity. The ANOVA revealed significant PRACTICE (F -19.3, G-G = 0.72, P < 0 0001) ELECTRODE%; x96 = 18.3, G-G = 0.24, P < O.OOdl), and PRACTICE by ELECTRODES (F,, 2xx = 3.6, G-G = 0.24, P = 0.004) effects. In session' 1, positivity is higher at Cz than at Pz (P = O.OOS), and higher at Pz compared to Fz (P = 0.00031, as shown in Fig. 3 . Practice then leads to a clear reduction in positivity at frontal and central recording sites from Session 1 to 2 and from Session 2 to 3 but not from Session 3 to 4 (Fz: Sl vs S2, P = 0.01; S2 vs S3, P = 0.005; S3 vs S4, n.s.; Cz: Sl vs S2, P = 0.004; S2 vs S3, P = 0.01; S3 vs S4, n.s.>. Similar session to session changes were not significant for parietal electrodes (Pz: Sl vs S2, n.s.; S2 vs S3, n.s., S3 vs S4, n.s.>, and in G-G = 0.93, P = 0.01) and by PRACTICE (F3,3h = 4.6, G-G = 0.65, P = 0.02). No other main or interaction effect and no effect involving ELECTRODES reached significance.
Task difficulty leads to an increase (easy: 991. 6 (Fig.  4) . Post-hoc comparisons show that, regarding difficulty, only the difference between easy and difficult tasks reaches significance (P = 0.004). Regarding practice, there was no significant overall change from one session to the other, but the difference between Session 1 and 4 is highly significant (P = 0.008).
Pre-response amplitude (response-synchronized). sites (Pz: easy vs difficult, P = 0.05; easy vs moderate, P = O.OOS), whereas frontal (Fz) and central (Cz) preresponse amplitudes did not differ for different task difficulties (Fig. 6 ). In addition, during difficult tasks pre-response amplitude was more negative at left compared to right frontal and central electrode sites (difficult tasks: F3 vs F4, P = 0.03; C3 vs C4, P = 0.004; P.3 vs P4, n.s.1. Comparable lateralization effects were not found for moderate and easy tasks. The marginal significant PRACTICE effect can be traced back to a more negative pre-response amplitude in the first scssion compared to all other sessions (Sl: -3.5 PV f8.1, s2: -1.4 * 8.6; s3: 1.1 f 8.7; s4: 1.6 f 7.7; Sl vs s2, P = 0.03; Sl vs s3. P = 0.02; Sl vs s4, P = 0.05).
Correlation between EEG urd belmlioral data
RTO is a behavioral and offset latency of slow wave (off-SW) is a neurophysiological parameter for processing time. Fig. 4 depicts the relation between these variables differentiated for problem difficulty and practice. Two effects are visible: First, response indication (RTO) for easy tasks takes place during positivity and for difficult tasks during negativity. Second, RTO and offset latency of slow wave become increasingly more similar with practice.
An ANOVA with the within factors PRACTICE. DIFFICULTY and PARAME-TERS (RTO vs offset latency of slow wave) confirms this. There is no overall difference between the PA-RAMETERS, but there is a significant PARAMETER by DIFFICULTY (F2,7J = 14.2, G-G = 0.95, P = 0.0001) and a marginally significant PARAMETER by PRACTICE interaction (f&, = 2.7, G-G = 0.80, P = 0.07). Post-hoc mean comparisons reveal that for easy tasks RTO was significantly shorter than offset latency of slow wave (P = O.OOl), while for difficult tasks the opposite was true (P = 0.007). Regarding practice, RTO was significant larger than offset latency of slow wave in the first session (P = 0.05). No significant diffcrcnces were found for the other sessions. 
Discussion
Response time speeds up significantly across practice sessions, and this speed-up follows the power law (see Fig. 1 ). Practice also leads to an attenuation of the problem-size effect, although, the effect is still rcliablc in the fourth session. These results are in agreement with Fendrich, ct al. [13] , who used similar problems but a diffcrcnt rcsponsc indication procedure.
Still. the mean reaction times in their study (time until subjects typed the first answer digit on a numeric keypad) arc comparable with our RTO. The close comparability between these studies underlines the success of adopting Fendrich, et al.'s mental arithmetic paradigm to an EEG study.
The ERP is characterized by a pronounced late positivity followed by a slow wave, and a negativity slightly before and during response. The late positivity peaks at 300 ms and seems to be a 'P300-like' component. Howcvcr. WC arc reluctant to label it a P300. because if does not fulfill the criteria of a classical P300 [ 1 I] (i.e. no clear parictal maximum).
This late positive component is followed by a slow wave lasting from about 500 to 1000 ms.
The observed components are related. but differently to practice and problem difficulty. Practice mainly affected the offset latency of slow wave and the topography of positivity. In the first session, positivity was focused at Cz (22 PV) and Pz (20 PV), but also rcachcd a considcrablc peak at Fz (15 WV). With practice, frontal and central positivity significantly decreased. while parictal positivity was unaffected.
In the fourth session. then. positivity was highest at Pz. The amplitude of positivity did not vary with problem difficulty. Offset latency of slow, wave was less with easy tasks and dccreascd with practice. Pre-response ncgativity was cspccially high in the first training session, and ;I higher pre-response negativity at parietal rccording sites during difficult as compared to easy tasks was found.
In addition. for difficult tasks. prc-response amplitude was more negative at left compared to right frontal and central recording sites.
In the first session. positivity could be obscrvcd at 2111 electrode sites. suggesting that frontal. central, and parietal corticics were involved in the processing of the problem. With practice, frontal and central positivity substantially decreased, while parietal positivity was unaffected.
Ncuropsychological studies indicate that the frontal brain is involved whcncver mental activity is deliberate and controlled [ 15, 20, 24] . Moreover. frontal brain lesions cause deficits when remembering rcquircs the initiation and maintenance of cffortful stratcgics of encoding and/or rctricval [21] . From this point of view, it makes scnsc that the more the processing of the arithmetic task becomes automatized or proccduralized, the less frontal cortical activity will be ob-served. Such an outcome is also consistent with the idea that frontal activity may reflect an executive function which allocates resources and/or organizes the processing stages of the task [31, 35] . Automatized processing no longer requires deliberate resource allocation. The finding that parietal positivity did not change with practice suggests that this brain region is functionally necessary to answer retrieval, by direct access [29] rather than by conscious calculational procedure. This evidence also fits with neuropsychological data, showing that arithmetic deficits in adults, who developed high arithmetic skill prior to brain insult, tend to be associated with parietal brain lesions [15, 16] . Neurophysiological studies using an irregularity index of the EE( i or measures of regional blood flow which retlect cortical activation also found a increased temporocent ro-parietal activity during mental arithmetic [ 14. 3 I] .
The interpretation of parietal positivity as a sign of ans\ver retrieval gains support by the observation that offset latency of slow wave decreased with practice and increased with problem-size.
The easier the task and the more practice is completed.
the quicker the problem gets processed.
However, problem-size did not effect the topography or amplitude of positivity. This could mean that easy and difficult problems activate similar cortical networks, whereby difficult problems neell more processing time because of less established problem-to-answer association-pathways. Rickard and Bourne 1281 recently developed an interactive activation model of multiplication fact retrieval that is consistrbnt with this interpretation (for related models, see [ 1.7.23]). The basic architecture assumes localist. abstrait representations at three levels: (a) an clement level, in which the three mathematically essential elements of the problem (e.g. 4.9. and x for the problem '4 X 9 = ') are represented. (b) a problem level in which there is a unique node representing each problem, and (c) an answer level. in which there are nodes representing arithmetic answers. There are excitatory connectionh between levels. For example, the elements 4,7. and Y have excitatory connections to the problem node 4 X 7. There are inhibitory connections within levels. Performance is simulated by providing activation to problem elements of the first level. and then letting this activation spread cyclically to the problem and ans\ler levels. During the initial cycle, multiple problem and answer nodes become active. As cycling proceeds, all but one problem -answer node combination (usually the correct one) are typically inhibited.
In this model, the number of candidate problem and answer nodes that become active early in processing does not vary systematically with problem difficulty. This characteri!,tic of the model seems to map closely onto the observation of no difference in peak positivity attriblltable to problem difficulty. However, because associ.ktions among problem and answer nodes arc assumed to be weaker and less coherent for difficult problems, more cycles are necessary to suppress incorrect problem and answer nodes for difficult problems, which is again consistent with the ERP data.
Pre-response negativity was found to be significantly reduced for easy compared to difficult arithmetic tasks at parietal recording sites, and pre-response negativity generally declined as training progressed. Similar results have been reported by Ruchkin et al. 1351, who used addition or substraction as easy tasks and division for difficult problems.
Negativity was larger for more difficult than easy problems, and this effect was more pronounced at Pz and Cz compared to Fz, Oz, and Fpz. In both studies (see also [3] ) the response related slow-wave was more pronounced at left compared to right recording sites. Thus, in spite of the different behavioral paradigms, the results regarding the response related slow-wave amplitude are in good concordance.
How might the response-related negativity be interpreted behaviorally'? A direct association with response production is unlikely, since responses were very similar for easy and difficult task (see also [35] ) and no unequivocal relation between response indication and ERP-negativity was found (see Fig. 4 ). Somehow, negativity must reflect the association between production and motor programming prior to response execution. That is, the manner in which the response in prepared, which depends on what happens cognitively, seems to be the most likely concommitant of negativity in the EEG. The prior occurrence of mediating strategies might be implicated.
Consider that, in the first session and during more difficult tasks, it is likely that subjects are not able to retrieve aritmetic facts from memory directly. Back-up calculation strategies are activated [2] , leading to excitatory processes in parietal brain areas producing negativity in the EEG [4] . In this context, the relatively large and longlasting negativities found by Ruchkin et al. [34, 35] and Riisler and Hcil [321 during mental arithmetic could be attributed to their use of complicated and unusual arithmetic tasks (e.g.. subjects had to divide a 3-digit number by 7 and compute the remainder). This interpretation would also fit the observation that cortical negativity covaries with signs of conscious awareness of mental processes [17,18.30] . Conscious processing is more likely at the beginning of training and during difficult tasks [24] .
One critical question is whether this negativity confounded the measurement of the offset latency of slow wave and thus leads us to draw misleading conclusions about the offset latency of slow wave. The data indicate that negativity was greater for difficult and moderate compared to easy tasks at parietal recording sites, and tended to be greater during the first compared to the other sessions. This could have led to a shortening of the positive slow wave under these conditions. However, we still found that the offset latency of slow wave was increased at all recording sites for difficult tasks and in the first session. It is very unlikely that our findings are due to a confounding of the measures, since the negativity effect occurs at parietal electrodes only, and the offset latency of slow wave effect at all recording sites. Additionally, a confounding would have led to an understimation of the effects and not to misleading conclusions.
In summary, our data show that skill acquisition for simple multiplication problems through practice leads to clear behavioral changes measured by response time. Moreover, skill aquisition was reflected in systematic ERP changes. Fronto-central positivity diminished from session to session, and the focus of positivity centered finally at centro-prietal regions. Positivity was interpreted as a sign for retrieval of arithmetic facts from cortical networks.
Since problem-size did not affect amplitude or localization of positivity, but, was related to offset latency of slow wave, one could speculate that difficult and easy tasks activate the same cortical networks. and only differ in processing time. The high pre-response negativity observed in the first session and during more difficult tasks was suggested to reflect mediating strategies. However, further empirical studies arc needed to evaluate the suggested functional difference between the positive and negative components of the ERP related to simple multiplication problems.
